Donald Trump has already claimed that his promotion of ceasefires in Africa and Asia makes him fully deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize, but if he really wants to be recognised as a top peacemaker, then he needs to do something about the Middle East. This is the big test that has been set for generations of would-be peacemakers, ever since Israel first gained its independence in 1948, and it is particularly urgent now.
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin shared the prize in 1978 for agreeing a treaty, urged on by US president Jimmy Carter. This treaty lasted, although Sadat was assassinated for his troubles in 1981. But to get Begin to agree Sadat had to set the Palestinian issue aside.
Sorting out the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip then became the main challenge. There was an apparent breakthrough in the early 1990s, based on the Oslo peace accords, leading in 1994 to another peace prize. It was shared by Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin for agreeing a road map to a two-state solution in 1994.
The next year Rabin was assassinated, and the prospects never looked quite so bright again, although Bill Clinton put a substantial effort into coming up with a comprehensive solution at the dog end of his presidency in 2000. Attempts to find a way for Israelis and Palestinians to co-exist that have ended in failure, disappointment and disillusion. Many ceasefires have been agreed but their number only reflects the regular resort to violence.
Meanwhile, the effort to forge relations between Israel and the Arab states that for decades have refused to acknowledge its existence has been more successful. Trump believed that his success in getting a number to sign up to peace treaties with Israel in 2020 — the Abraham Accords — was another good reason for him to get the Peace Prize. Saudi Arabia is the most important country yet to sign up, and that is conditional on progress on the Palestinian issue.
Another reason why it could seem timely to address this issue is that over the past twelve months, Israel has also seen its most deadly enemies of recent years — Iran and Hezbollah — knocked back and an old enemy — Syria — under new management. Its security environment in principle is more benign than ever before.
This assessment could even be extended to Gaza, where Hamas as a military force is a shadow of its former self. If Netanyahu had chosen to cash in his winnings he could have offered Israel a more hopeful, and more peaceful, future. But he has spent his political career doing his best to thwart such a deal, and he is now in coalition with extremists whose “solution” to this problem would be to see Palestinians expelled from all the occupied territories to make room for more settlers.
The result of the path he has chosen has been to create conditions that make it easier for Hamas to survive and are steadily turning Israel into an international pariah. The idea of a separate Palestinian state is now being embraced by countries, including Britain, that until recently accepted it only as a pleasant but unrealistic idea.
I wrote last year explaining my scepticism about a two-state solution — not because this would be an undesirable outcome but because there was no plausible way to get there. I saw the most important and immediate task as addressing the dire conditions in Gaza, establishing effective governance in the Strip, and making progress on reconstruction. Since I wrote that, however, the situation inside Gaza has deteriorated further, and recognition of a Palestinian state, as a political project if not yet a functioning entity, is now firmly on the international agenda, presented as the only route to a lasting peace.
There are still grounds for scepticism. This is not going to lead to a Palestinian state any time soon, yet the immediate needs of Gaza require urgent attention. But the idea of a Palestinian state, which was accepted by past Israeli governments, has now become a way of warning the current government about the extent of its international isolation.
This is a symptom of a fundamental crisis in Israeli strategy. Netanyahu’s government has set itself objectives it cannot reach while ruling out any political role for Palestinian representatives. But without negotiations it lacks a means of stabilising the situation, let alone getting its hostages back. So long as it has American support the government may take the view that it can resist any pressure to change course. It is unclear whether Trump will back the Israelis in its current strategy for much longer. But what should be of even more concern for Israel is what support it will get following Trump.
At the start of 2025 there were grounds for optimism that the war would soon end. A deal was reached just before Trump’s inauguration, and Israel and Hamas began to swap hostages for prisoners. This process lasted for two months. For each of the thirty-three hostages returned from captivity some fifty Palestinians were released from Israeli prisons. Humanitarian aid was allowed to enter Gaza to enable displaced Palestinians to return to their homes. There were supposed to be talks leading to a permanent ceasefire, which in turn was supposed to set the conditions for a second stage in which all the remaining living hostages, military as well as civilian, would be exchanged for yet more prisoners. The third stage would see the remains of the deceased hostages released.
But allegations of non-compliance went back and forth from the start. In mid-February Hamas briefly suspended the release of hostages because of continued Israeli military action and a lack of sufficient aid. The process resumed but with constant accusations of bad faith.
On 1 March, when the first phase was due to end, Israel proposed that it should simply be extended, but Hamas rejected this because it wanted to move to the second stage which would see the war come to a complete end. Netanyahu wanted to retain the option of resuming military operations. When Hamas refused to accept his proposal, Israel blocked the entry of aid to Gaza and also the supply of electricity. On 18 March, it resumed airstrikes on Gaza.
In May, Israel began another military offensive, this one named Gideon’s Chariots. The plan pointed towards occupying all of Gaza, with the declared twin aim of defeating Hamas and releasing the hostages. A push would concentrate the population in the south and then deny Hamas leverage over the population by controlling the supplies of humanitarian aid. Two months on, this offensive is being wound down. Hamas has not been defeated, the hostages have not been released, the population is more or less where it was before, and the distribution of food and other assistance has been a complete and catastrophic shambles leading to famine conditions in Gaza.
The backlash against Israeli policies has left it isolated internationally. It is running out of options. The hardliners want to continue to occupy all of Gaza, even if this means sacrificing the hostages, and the government has decided to proceed along this path with yet another offensive, making the same claim as before that this will produce total victory.
One reason why Hamas is feeling stronger is because of the anger that has been directed at Israel as the Palestinian population suffers. The problem Israel sought to solve (and how much of a problem it actually was has been questioned) was Hamas’s ability to steal from international agencies as food was being delivered, and then to use this to gain influence over Gaza’s population. Israel’s alternative approach limited the amount of aid going into Gaza and changed the method of distribution. This involved an organisation called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, apparently designed for the situation but evidently not fit for purpose. The idea was to distribute aid directly to Palestinians at four sites — three in south Gaza (to where Israel wanted people to relocate) and one more centrally, instead of moving the aid to where it was needed.
The scheme has been described, including in the Israeli press, as a colossal failure, with desperate scenes as Palestinians scramble for whatever sustenance they can find, malnourished children, shootings close to the distribution sites, and still no practical means of checking whether Hamas operatives were taking advantage.
Israel blames Hamas for the famine conditions, moans about fake videos and wilful exaggerations, but it is complaining largely to itself. As the occupying power it is responsible and it adopted what was widely recognised to be a scheme that was ineffective and harmful. Statements by Israeli ministers suggested a coercive element as well as incompetence. National security minister Itmar Ben-Gvir declared, “The only way to win the war and bring back the hostages is to completely stop the ‘humanitarian’ aid, conquer the entire Gaza Strip, and encourage voluntary migration.”
The Israeli government has belatedly appreciated the political damage caused by images of a starving population. The aid is moving again, and the UN is once again involved, although the levels are still too small. Tellingly, the Economist observed that:
Mr Netanyahu promised in a statement in English that Israel “will continue to work with international agencies” and “ensure that large amounts of humanitarian aid flows into the Gaza Strip.” In Hebrew he was much less emollient, promising his base that “in Gaza we are continuing to fight” and that “we will achieve our aim of destroying Hamas.” The aid entering Gaza, he said, would be “minimal.”
The humanitarian crisis, along with moves, led by militant settlers, to take more territory from Palestinians in the West Bank, and talk of annexations, put European governments under enormous domestic political pressure to denounce Israel’s actions and urge it to reverse course. This is what led to the push for a Palestinian state, starting with French president Macron with others, including the British government, following behind.
Israel complains that international moves to recognise a Palestinian state reward Hamas. That was not, in fact, one of Hamas’s objectives when it rampaged into southern Israel on 7 October 2023. It then had a variety of possible motives: inflicting pain on Israelis as an act of “resistance”; responding to settler activity in the West Bank and Jerusalem; demonstrating that it was putting up more of a fight than the hapless Palestinian Authority leadership in Ramallah; obstructing the proposed “normalisation” of Israeli–Saudi relations; and, high up on the list, taking as many hostages as possible to swap for Palestinian militants stuck in Israeli jails. There was no demand to adopt a “two-state” solution because that was not its policy.
It has on occasion said that it would not oppose a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza but its own demand is for all of Israel and not just the occupied bits. That is what the chant of “from the river to the sea” is all about. For Netanyahu, this lack of interest in a separate Palestinian state was one of Hamas’s most attractive features. It was why he was content to leave it in charge in Gaza, assuming that there was little harm it could do other than send an occasional barrage of missiles into Israel. It kept the Palestinians divided and rendered negotiations impractical.
In the aftermath of the attacks, which disqualified Hamas from running Gaza in the future, Netanyahu went out of his way to avoid addressing the question of who would replace it. Any serious non-Hamas, non-Israeli arrangement is bound to involve Palestinians and would be unpopular among the hardline elements of his own coalition. These elements still hanker to expel the Palestinians altogether, or squeeze them into a small enclave, to enable them to resettle the abandoned land.
The Israeli government is now discussing yet another new offensive, this time one that would have the IDF push into the remaining 25 per cent of the territory to seek out and destroy the remaining pockets of Hamas’s strength. This would be done without regard for the hostages, the humanitarian situation, and the even stronger international objections that would result.
The UN is already warning about “catastrophic consequences.” Of more concern to the government are the well-publicised objections of IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir that not only will an attempt at full occupation endanger the remaining hostages, as fighting moves close to where they are held, but it will also stretch further the IDF, already exhausted after almost two years of fighting. The alternative military option is not exactly promising. Encircling Hamas-held areas without entering them in force would likely lead to an attritional guerrilla war. The prospect either way is of a forever war without any obvious conclusion.
Because Netanyahu has no credible policy of his own for the long-term it is not surprising that the gap is being filled by the only political option that commands widespread international support. Recognising a Palestinian state can be dismissed as little more than a gesture as there is little there to be recognised. For now it is best seen as a protest against a reckless and self-defeating Israeli policy. If nothing else it tells the Israelis how much they have lost the “narrative battle” in Europe, having already lost it in much of the southern hemisphere a long time ago. Already, 147 states are signed up to recognition.
The difference Britain and France make is that they are both permanent members of the Security Council. If they supported a resolution backing a Palestinian state then it would leave the United States exercising its veto. This Trump would probably do. Unlike Biden, who supported the two-state policy, he does not. Nor is he influenced by the same considerations as Europeans, such as appeals to international law and human rights. When Canada joined proposals to recognise a Palestinian state he claimed this as justification to raise tariffs.
His view of the Middle East is, however, different from that of Netanyahu. He has not bothered to align other policies with Israel — on the Houthis or the ending of the war with Iran, and he has taken different stances on Turkey and Syria. He puts a high priority on his relations with the Gulf monarchies. And most of all he dislikes wars that go on forever and cannot be concluded quickly. He may not want to break with Israel over Gaza but he does not appear to be impressed and has expressed concern about the humanitarian situation.
If he really wants to take an initiative he has been handed an opportunity by Arab countries. At a UN conference on a two-state solution, which the United States did not attend, the twenty-two members of the Arab League unanimously supported a declaration, signed also by Britain and members of the European Union, that called for Hamas to lay down its weapons, release all hostages and end its rule of the Gaza Strip, as essential pre-conditions for the establishment of a Palestinian state.
“In the context of ending the war in Gaza,” it read, “Hamas must end its rule in Gaza and hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority, with international engagement and support, in line with the objectives of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state.”
As important, the declaration also called for the deployment of “a temporary international stabilisation mission,” invited by the Palestinian Authority, and ‘under the aegis of the United Nations.”
Israel made its customary denunciation of calls for a Palestinian state as supporting Hamas, although Hamas was none too pleased by the document’s boost to the Palestinian Authority, based in the West Bank, let alone the demands that it disarm. The document’s call to normalise relations with Israel elicited from Hamas a mirror image of Israel’s complaints about calls for a Palestinian state: “Talk about integrating the Zionist entity into the region is a reward to the enemy for its crimes.”
US negotiator Steve Witkoff reportedly told hostage families that the United States is developing a new position involving an ultimatum to Hamas to release all the hostages at once, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, followed by complete disarmament in return for the end of Israel’s military operation. If it refused the Israeli campaign would continue. Hamas has long said it will not disarm (and even if it did it is not clear how this could be implemented and monitored) and has now added that it would only do so if a Palestinian state were established. (Its language could be taken to mean that it was still after all of Israel and not just the occupied territories.)
For Israel this just shows how Hamas is exploiting the Europeans naivete in recognising a Palestinian state. Hamas is undoubtedly being opportunistic, but it is Netanyahu that has given them the opportunity. His insistence on a total victory over Hamas mean that all Hamas needs to do to claim its own victory is to survive while using the distressed state of the population as a weapon against Israel. Without serious governance arrangements in Gaza the situation there will remain violent and anarchic, allowing Hamas to keep going. But any new arrangements will involve Arab and European states, as well as the Palestinian Authority, and will nod in the direction of a future Palestine state.
As before, except now in much more desperate circumstances, the rejectionist policies of Hamas and the Israeli government feed off one another, providing each with an excuse not to make concessions.
Within Israel opposition to the government’s policies is growing, especially among the diplomatic and security community, who can see no credible end game and worry about Israel’s increasing international isolation. The generation in the US and Europe that saw Israel as the underdog — a small, beleaguered state in a sea of hostility — has been replaced by one that sees it as cruel and heartless.
Whatever position Trump decides to adopt, support for Israel has been haemorrhaging on both the left and right of American politics, and that will influence the policies of his successor. A Pew poll in April found that about 53 per cent of US adults now express an unfavourable opinion of Israel, up from 42 per cent before the Hamas attack. Another Pew poll, conducted in June found that in twenty of twenty-four countries surveyed, half or more of adults had an unfavourable view of Israel. The figures are higher among younger people. One of the largest gaps in the United States is between young and old. There, alienation from Israel is also becoming apparent in the Jewish community.
Taking a long view, peace diplomacy, in all its forms, has by and large served Israel well. It can claim that it has demonstrated the benefits of peace through strength. By showing resilience and military prowess, it convinced past enemies that there was no point in preparing for a war none wished to fight. Now it has put itself in an even better position by coming out on top in its recent battles with Iran and its proxies. Yet it simply does not know what to do with Gaza.
Israel does not have a sure military route to free the hostages. They are the last serious bargaining card that Hamas has and they will not play it until Israeli military operations stop. Yet Israel does not need Hamas to make a push to ease the humanitarian distress in Gaza, and nor does it need Hamas to agree a plan for Gaza’s future governance and reconstruction. For that it will have willing partners in the Gulf and Europe. These measures will undercut Hamas more than yet another offensive, for they will weaken its political base and not just its military base.
It is important not to underestimate the challenge of developing new governance and security structures in a situation, full of trauma and suspicion, involving many external actors with their own agendas. Nor can we expect Netanyahu to embrace the challenge, not least because to do so would be to break his coalition. But continuing with the current policies requires Israel to accept responsibility for the progressive immiseration of the Palestinian people without it ever being sure that it has truly eliminated Hamas, while further straining relations not only with its old friends in the West but its new friends in the Arab world.
Trump’s most recent comments don’t offer a ringing endorsement of Israeli strategy. He wants the United States to take bigger role in handling the humanitarian aspects of the crisis. The Gazans, “are obviously not doing too well with the food,” he has noted, adding that “Israel is going to help us with that in terms of distribution and also money.” That is his focus. “As far as the rest of it, I really can’t say, that’s going to be pretty much up to Israel.”
Whether or not this will get him his Nobel Prize, if he is really concerned to preserve and extend the Abraham Accords as well as prevent the humanitarian situation getting even worse, then Israel’s next steps should concern him greatly. Israel is divided on its next steps. Netanyahu needs the extremists to keep him in power but they do not offer a tenable prospectus. A forever war means constant insecurity and increasing isolation. Many Israelis, including in the IDF and the intelligence agencies, know this and are pushing back. Trump would do well to join them. •
